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THE EQUAL RIGHTs AMENDMENT:
A WOMAN's RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM
Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974)
Plaintiff's husband developed bladder and bowel incontinence, para-
plegia, and malfunction of his sexual organs after being a patient in
the care of the defendants. Based on these injuries, plaintiff's husband
brought an action in negligence and plaintiff sued for loss of consor-
tium. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, holding that it
failed to state an actionable injury. On appeal, the superior court re-
versed and remanded the issue for a consolidated trial with the hus-
band's action.1 After granting allocatur, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania affirmed the superior court's decision and held: Under the
Pennsylvania equal rights amendment,2 a wife must be allowed a right
to recover for loss of consortium equivalent to that which is enforced
in favor of a husband.'
The development and expansion of the action for loss of consortium
reflects the changing socio-legal role of women over the past three
hundred years. 4 At common law, a wife was little more than a chattel
belonging to her husband,5 and, as the definition of consortium
evolved, emphasis was placed on the domestic services she owed her
husband.8 Interference with a husband's right of consortium gave rise
1. Hopkins v. Blanco, 224 Pa. Super. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1972).
2. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 provides: "Equality of right under the law shall not
be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the
individual."
3. Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
4. The definition of consortium has always depended upon the social concept of
marital roles. As societal standards have changed, the nature of the action has been
altered. See Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MicH. L REv.
1 (1923); Loppman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. Rlv. 651 (1930).
5. At common law a woman's identity was incorporated into that of her husband
or into the marriage entity. 1 W. BLACKSToNE, CommnNTAEiEs *442:
mhat is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the hus-
band ....
6. The analogy to the master-servant relationship was described in Guy v. Livesey,
79 Eng. Rep. 428, 428 (KB. 1629) (footnote omitted):
mhe action is not brought in respect of the harm done to the wife, but it
is brought for the particular loss of the husband, for that he lost the company
of his wife, which is only a damage and loss to himself, for which he shall
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to a cause of action distinct from any right to recover directly for in-
juries sustained by the wife.' Since the husband owed no reciprocal
services to the wife, she was denied a corresponding cause of action.8
In the nineteenth century, this service-centered conception of consor-
tium gave way to a view emphasizing the more intangible characteris-
tics of marriage.9 This trend reflected the increasing equality of the
social roles of women and men. After passage of the Married
Women's Acts, 10 a husband was no longer the legal master of his wife,
and the cause of action itself underwent a transition." Increasingly,
have this action, as the master shall have for the loss of his servant's service.
See Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Inc., 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Feneff v. New
York Cent. & H.R.R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909); Jacobson v. Siddal, 12
Ore. 280,7 P. 108 (1885); Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1620).
7. Originally, a husband could maintain his action only upon intentional interfer-
ence with consortium. See Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1620). It was
not until the expansion of negligence actions in the nineteenth century that negligent
interference became actionable. See Skoglund v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 45 Minn. 330, 47
N.W. 1071 (1891); Blair v. Chicago & A. Ry., 89 Mo. 334, 1 S.W. 367 (1886); Leap-
hart & McCann, Consortium: An Action for the Wife, 34 MONT. L. REv. 75, 79 (1973).
8. A wife had no right to the services of her husband and was therefore denied
any recovery. In Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L. 1861), a third party wrong-
fully caused a husband to send his wife away from his home. The husband and wife
sought recovery on the basis of the wife's loss of consortium. Denying recovery, the
court stated:
The loss of such service of the wife, the husband, who alone has all the prop-
erty of the married parties, may repair by hiring another servant; but the wife
sustains only the loss of the comfort of her husband's society and affectionate
attention, which the law cannot estimate or remedy.
Id. at 863. Even at that early date, Lord Chancellor Campbell, dissenting, argued that
the wife had presented a valid cause of action and that if the alienation was a direct
consequence of the defendant's act, recovery should be permitted. Id. at 860. See 3
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMES, * 142.
9. This expanded concept of consortium included considerations seemingly relevant
to both husband and wife, such as conjugal society, companionship, and sexual relations.
See, e.g., Woodson v. Bailey, 210 Ala. 568, 98 So. 809 (1924); Foot v. Card, 58 Conn.
1, 18 A. 1027 (1889); Comment, A Wife's Right to Recover for the Loss of Consortium,
2 CuNmE.-SAM. L. REv. 189 (1971).
10. The so-called Married Women's Acts or Emancipation Acts were enacted by
most jurisdictions in the late nineteenth century. They were intended to abolish restric-
tions placed upon married women by the common law, but were generally interpreted
as creating no new rights. Holbrook, supra note 4, at 4, stated:
The different Married Women's Acts are almost infinitely various in their spe-
cific provisions. But they agree in their general purpose to ameliorate the dis-
advantageous position in which the woman was placed by common law.
In some states the acts had a profound effect on the previously controlling definition
of consortium. See, e.g., Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 60 N.W. 202 (1894); Westlake
v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621 (1878).
11. In some instances, claims by husbands based on loss of consortium were no
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the courts came to view consortium as the marital rights of each party,12
and some states began to allow wives to recover for willful or malicious
interference with consortium."3 It was not until 1950, however, in
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,14 that the wife's right to recover for loss of
consortium based on negligent injury to her husband was recognized.' 5
A majority of jurisdictions have followed Hitaffer on the ground that
the law should no longer tolerate discrimination based on an archaic
conception of human rights.16 Other jurisdictions have refused to rec-
longer limited to the traditional "services-due" argument. In Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134
Mass. 123 (1883), the plaintiff, alleging that the defendant had raped his wife, based
his action upon loss of consortium even though he had suffered no loss of services. Al-
lowing recovery, the court stated:
A husband is not the master of his wife, and can maintain no action for the
loss of her services as his servant. His interest is expressed by the word con-
sortium,-the right to the conjugal fellowship of the wife, to her company, co-
operation and aid in every conjugal relation.
Id. at 124 (emphasis original). See Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppedge, 116 Ark.
334, 172 S.W. 885 (1915).
12. In some instances when wives sought to recover for loss of consortium, courts
simply abolished the action rather than adjust to the changing social standards. See
Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods
Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915).
13. In Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee, 144 Conn. 155, 158, 128 A.2d 330, 331 (1956),
the court held that when injury to the spouse was the result of negligence, there could
be no recovery for loss of consortium. The court distinguished cases permitting recovery
for loss of consortium in an action for alienation of affection, an intentional tort. This
distinction paralleled the earlier development of the husband's action. See note 7 supra.
See also Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So. 2d 852 (1942); Foot v. Card, 58 Conn.
1, 18 A. 1027 (1889); Reppert v. Reppert, 40 Del. 492, 13 A.2d 705 (1940); Ramsey
v. Ramsey, 34 Del. 576, 156 A. 354 (1931); Holmes v. Holmes, 133 Ind. 386, 32 N.E.
932 (1893); Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621 (1897).
14. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
15. A wife's right to recovery for negligently-caused loss of consortium was first rec-
ognized in Hipp v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, Inc., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921).
That case, however, was overruled four years later. Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co.,
189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925). It is interesting to note that Holbrook, supra note
4, written in the period between the two decisions, found Hipp to be very persuasive
and predicted it would lead to another development in the law of consortium.
16. Twenty-nine jurisdictions have affirmed a wife's right to recover. See Luther
v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1958) (applying Nebraska law); Hitaffer v. Argonne
Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950); Duffy v. Lipsman-
Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961) (applying Montana law); Swartz
v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 304 So. 2d 881 (1974); Schreiner v. Fruit,
519 P.2d 462 (Alas. 1974); Glendale v. Brodshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972);
Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Crouch v.
West, 29 Colo. App. 72, 477 P.2d 805 (1970); Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d
717 (1961); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Smith v. Tn-State Culvert Mfg.
Co., 126 Ga. App. 508, 191 S.E.2d 92 (1972); Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 Idaho 199, 418
509
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ognize any right of action in the wife equivalent to that vested in the
husband."7 Infrequent efforts to enforce the wife's claims by recourse
to the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution have gained
limited support.'8
In 1960, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the justifica-
tion for the husband's action for loss of consortium had disappeared
with the common law concept of the marriage relationship and deter-
mined that the action should not be extended to the wife.10 The court,
however, viewed abolition of the action as a legislative responsibility, 0
P.2d 562 (1966); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Troue v.
Marker, 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d 800 (1969); Accuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.
2d 480 (1956); Johnson v. Lohre, 508 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1974); Deems v. Western Md.
Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1966); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101
N.W.2d 227 (1960); Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865
(1969); Novak v. Kansas City Transp., Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); General
Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); LaBonte v. National Gypsum
Co., 110 N.H. 314, 269 A.2d 634 (1970); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J.
82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Milington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239
N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968); Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile.Cadillac, Inc.,
22 Ohio St. 2d 65, 258 N.E.2d 230 (1970); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Ore. 429, 397 P.2d
529 (1965); Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974); Hoekstra v. Helge-
land, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34
Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
17. Some courts have justified their refusal to recognize the wife's action by reason-
ing that such a break with the common law should occur only as result of legislative
action. See, e.g., Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960);
Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me. 340, 211 A.2d 891 (1965); Nelson v. A.M. Lockett & Co.,
206 Okla. 334, 243 P.2d 719 (1952); Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570
(1962).
Other courts have argued that such a right might result in double recovery. See, e.g.,
Deshotel v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958); Hoffman
v. Dautel, 192 Kan. 406, 388 P.2d 615 (1964); Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211,
387 P.2d 321 (1963). Given the present understanding of consortium, this argument
is unconvincing-if it applies to the wife, it should apply equally to the husband.
18. Where the constitutional issue has been raised, it has sometimes prevailed. See
Karczewski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Il. 1967); Owen v. Illinois
Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
1971); Leffler v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App. 2d 67, 239 N.E.2d 235 (1968). But see Mis-
kunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1066 (1969); Krohn v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970 (1967).
19. Neuberg v. Bobowic, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960). The wife sought re-
covery for loss of consortium, arguing that there was no longer any justification for al-
lowing the action to the husband while denying it to the wife. The court acknowledged
that the husband was allowed recovery in Pennsylvania, but expressed its disapproval
of the action for loss of consortium, describing the action as an anachronism belonging
to an earlier day and age. Id. at 151-52, 162 A.2d at 664-65.
20. Id. at 157-58, 162 A.2d at 667. Many courts have similarly justified their refu-
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and Pennsylvania therefore remained in the position of allowing the ac-
tion to one spouse and denying it to the other. 1 The equal rights
amendment to the Pennsylvania constitution,2 2 effective in 1971, pro-
vided that the determination of individual rights arbitrarily on the basis
of sex was no longer permissible in the state.
In Hopkins v. Blanco,2" the plaintiff made three distinct arguments
for extending the action to the wife.24 First, she argued that on the
basis of the equality of the sexes, the court should adopt a new defini-
tion of consortium that would allow either spouse to recover for injury
to his or her marital interests.2 5 Although this reasoning was implicit
in the decision, it was not, in the court's opinion, the compelling con-
sideration. Second, plaintiff argued that extension of the action to the
wife was mandated by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the Federal Constitution. This position had been re-
jected previously by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,2 6 and was not
sal to extend the right to the wife. See note 17 supra. To date, at least four states
have enacted legislation dealing with the issue. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-209
(1973); KY. REV. STAT. § 411.145(2) (Supp. 1974); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-
a (1968); ORE. RFv. STAT. § 108.010 (1973).
21. This position was twice reaffirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Brown
v. Glenside Lumber & Coal Co., 429 Pa. 601, 240 A.2d 822 (1968); Pacewicz v. Young,
401 Pa. 191, 163 A.2d 91 (1960).
After the decision in Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 622 (1960), see
note 19 supra, support for preserving the husband's right of action increased. See Link
v. Highway Express Lines, Inc., 444 Pa. 447, 282 A.2d 727 (1971); Brown v. Philadel-
phia Transp. Co., 437 Pa. 348, 263 A.2d 423 (1970).
22. PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 27, quoted in note 2 supra.
23. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
24. Brief for Appellee at 4, Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
25. Most courts that extended the action to women reasoned that rights and duties
under the law must not offend contemporary social standards. See cases cited note 16
supra. As was stated in B. CARDozo, THE GROWTH or TH LAw 105-06 (1927):
Social, political and legal reforms had changed the relations between the sexes,
and put woman and man upon a plane of equality. Decisions founded upon
the assumption of a bygone inequality were unrelated to present-day realities,
and ought not be permitted to prescribe a rule of life.
26. Although the issue was apparently not raised by the parties, the dissent in
Brown v. Glenside Lumber & Coal Co., 429 Pa. 601, 605, 240 A.2d 822, 823 (1968),
emphasized the constitutional argument:
[1io determine eligibility for relief on the basis of the sex of the party seeking
recovery creates a totally irrational classification and thus denies equal protec-
tion. Simply, I believe that the time has come for this Court to "fish or cut
bait"---either to permit both the husband and wife to bring the action or to
deny the right to both.
The argument has prevailed in other jurisdictions. See cases cited note 18 supra.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) established that a
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addressed in the opinion. The third argument, based on the Pennsyl-
vania equal rights amendment, convinced the court that, since the ac-
tion was available to the husband, the amendment required that it be
equally available to the wife.
The proposed equal rights amendment to the Federal Constitution
closely resembles the Pennsylvania amendment, and may be expected
to have similar consequences.27  One court has noted that the amend-
ment will have little effect on the law of marriage and divorce, except
to move it more expeditiously in the direction it is already heading.28
As the court in Hopkins observed:
The obvious purpose of the Amendment was to put a stop to the in-
valid discrimination which was based on the sex of the person. The
Amendment gave legal recognition to what society had long recognized,
that men and women must have equal status in today's world. 20
Indeed, though modem society may recognize the equality of men and
women, remnants of the common law still deny equal legal rights. To
the exent that the law of marriage and divorce reflects that bias, an
equal rights amendment would remedy the inconsistency between soci-
ety's values and the law. 0 As the history of consortium shows, an
equal rights amendment may not always be necessary, but when in-
equity lingers long after it has lost any social justification, constitutional
amendment provides an immediate, compelling remedy. Although
statute which arbitrarily discriminated on the basis of sex is unconstitutional. This rul-
ing, however, does not seem to have resulted in any direct inroads into the law of domes-
tic relations. The Reed decision and others should encourage some equalization of mari-
tal rights. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Brenden v. Independent
School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th
Cir. 1973); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
27. See generally Symposium-The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J 871 (1971); Note, Sex Discrimination
and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARv. L. REV.
1499 (1971).
28. Corso v. Corso, 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 546, 555 (C.P. Allegheny County 1972).
29. 457 Pa. at -, 320 A.2d at 140.
30. Although the law of domestic relations has made adjustments as the premises
underlying the common law have changed, these adjustments have occurred only after
a substantial time-lag. Other areas of Pennsylvania law were also affected by the Penn-
sylvania equal rights amendment. See, e.g., Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d
324 (1974) (support of minor children); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. 278, 310
A.2d 426 (1973) (alimony for men); DeRosa v. DeRosa, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 71 (C.P.
Delaware County 1972) (counsel fees for wife); Corso v. Corso, 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 546
(C.P. Allegheny County 1972) (alimony for men); Kehl v. Kehl, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d
164 (C.P. Allegheny County 1972) (counsel fees for wife).
[Vol. 1975:507
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courts in Pennsylvania had previously spoken of the equal position of
wife and husband,3 it was not until the amendment supplied the con-
clusive argument that the courts acknowledged equal rights for loss of
consortium. While the law was moving in that direction, it had been do-
ing so for three hundred years. The equal rights amendment injected en-
forceable legal significance into the words uttered by the court when
it declared that arbitrary discrimination in marriage on the basis of sex
was unjust: "Today a husband and wife are equal partners in a mari-
tal relationship, and, as such, should be treated equally under the law
with respect to that relationship." 2
31. See, e.g., Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
32. Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, -, 320 A.2d 139, 140 (1974).
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